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ABSTRACT 
 
Product Market Integration, Comparative Advantages and 
Labour Market Performance 
 
In a two-country model with trade driven by comparative advantages, it is considered how 
imperfectly competitive labour markets are affected by lower frictions in international goods 
trade. Easier goods trading is equivalent to increased mobility of employment across 
countries and thus a change in the trade-off between wages and employment faced by wage 
setters. While the effects of product market integration on the trade-off between wages and 
employment in general is ambiguous, it is shown that product market integration works like a 
general improvement in productivity via the specialization it allows through trade. 
Unambiguously, real wages and employment and welfare improve upon reductions in trade 
frictions, and therefore workers are better off irrespective of whether the market power of 
unions is enhanced or muted. 
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1 Introduction
The globalization process has been most visible in financial market interac-
tions and the growth in trade flows (see e.g. IMF (2002)). However, labour
mobility has not been significantly aﬀected so far, and therefore eventual
labour market implications have to arise as a response to changes in capital
and goods markets. From a European perspective, the indirect labour mar-
ket consequences are potentially very important given that European product
market integration is proceeding fast and labour markets are often asserted
to suﬀer from structural problems. A concern often raised in the debate is
that international integration will be detrimental to employment creation due
to structural problems in the labour market. Others are concerned that the
process will weaken the position of workers by eroding trade union power.
The presence of a link between international integration and labour mar-
ket performance is suggested by casual evidence on adjustments to spe-
cific events, attempts at establishing cross-border cooperation between trade
unions, and the stress on European wage norms in wage formation. Empir-
ical analyses do also indicate that a Europeanization of labour markets is
taking place (see e.g. Andersen, Haldrup and Sørensen (2000)). However, all
this is indirect evidence, and does not really address the mechanisms through
which international integration aﬀects labour markets.
In this paper, we set up a two-country general equilibrium model to con-
sider some of the channels through which integration of product markets
aﬀect labour markets, even if labour is not internationally mobile. Much
of the debate has focused on how product market integration aﬀects the
wage elasticity of employment, since this is a key determinant of the eﬀective
bargaining power of trade unions (see e.g. Burda (1999)). Integration of
product markets may or may not make employment more sensitive to the
wage rate, and therefore it is in general ambiguous how the trade-oﬀ faced
by trade unions is aﬀected. The eﬀect of product market integration on
unions bargaining power can thus in general go either way. Still it is shown
that real wages and employment unambiguously increase. The reason is that
lower product market frictions make it possible to allocate production better
according to comparative advantages, and this is like a general productivity
increase making it possible to improve both real wages and employment. This
shows that there are gains from product market integration, also in economies
with imperfectly competitive labour markets. Interesting, although it is am-
biguous whether union power eﬀectively increases or decreases, workers are
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unambiguously better oﬀ. This result may explain why trade unions in most
European countries have been in favour of further European integration even
though it is uncertain how the market power of trade unions may be aﬀected
in the process.
The larger part of the theoretical literature on the labour market con-
sequences of product market integration has focused on the implications of
international integration for competitiveness in product markets and how this
aﬀects the market power which can be exerted in labour markets. Specifi-
cally, it has been analysed how lower trade frictions aﬀect the market power
in models of reciprocal dumping, and the basic eﬀects have been worked out
in partial equilibrium models (see e.g. Huizinga (1993), Sørensen (1993),
Naylor (1998), Andersen and Sørensen (2000))1. As is well-known the recip-
rocal dumping model can explain two-way trade in identical commodities,
and the basic reason for trade is product market power causing prices to ex-
ceed marginal costs which induces cross-country market entry. While these
models yield a number of interesting insights they rely on one particular
reason for trade (i.e. reciprocal dumping), which has been contested, and
also strategic assumptions (i.e. Cournot competition) which can be called
into question (see e.g. Krugman (1995)). Moreover, these models tend to be
partial equilibrium models in the sense that they focus on a specific sector,
ignoring interdependencies among sectors, and ignoring changes in the range
of goods produced.
The aim of this paper is to present a general equilibrium analysis of the
labour market implications of product market integration leading to more
specialization in production and an increase in international (intra-industrial)
trade. Recent empirical evidence indicates not only a strong increase in
intra-industrial trade (see e.g. Coppel and Durand (1999)), but also in spe-
cialization (see e.g. Midelfart-Knarvik et.al. (2000)). To explain observed
trade flows it is necessary to take into account comparative advantages, trade
frictions and the presence of non-traded commodities (see e.g. Davis and
Weinstein (2001)). It has also been documented that exporting firms tend
to have higher productivity than comparable non-exporting firms, and the
causality runs from productivity to export, i.e. productive firms become
exporters. Export is also associated with exit of less productive firms and
1Driﬃll and van der Ploeg (1993) present a model with an exogenously given specialized
production structure, and shows that wage formation is aﬀected when tariﬀs are lowered
because the responsiveness of prices to wages changes.
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reallocation of resources to more eﬃcient firms (see e.g. Bernhard and Jensen
(1999a,1999b), and Bernhard, Eaton, Jensen and Kotum (2001)). The model
presented here is in accordance with these stylized facts.
The idea underlying the following is that product market integration im-
proves the possibilities of relocation of employment across countries - one
basic channel through which this works is via changes in market shares, that
is, if foreign market shares in domestic markets increase it amounts to a
movement of jobs from domestic to foreign labour markets and vice versa.
This eﬀect is present even disregarding mobility of factors of production and
if firms are competitive. In the following, therefore, we consider this mecha-
nism in a setting in which factors of production are assumed not to be mobile
across countries, and where product markets are competitive in order to focus
on the basic mechanisms at stake.
Specifically, the model is an extension of the well-known Dornbusch, Fis-
cher and Samuelson (1977) model of Ricardian trade. Trade frictions mod-
elled as Samuelsons iceberg costs are present, and these trade frictions are
taken to be reduced in the process of international product market inte-
gration. We introduce market power in labour markets and consider how
reductions in trade frictions aﬀect labour market performance. One impor-
tant finding is that endogenous market shares imply that there is job mobility
across countries. Interestingly, the elasticity of labour demand is larger than
implied by the underlying structural preference parameter. Exploiting the
general equilibrium set-up we are able to evaluate the consequences of reduc-
tions in trade frictions both for the equilibrium allocation and for welfare.
The general equilibrium eﬀects are not trivial since relocation of jobs also
imply relocating income and thus employment. It is an implication that re-
ductions in trade frictions imply more trade (fewer goods are non-traded)
and specialization, with productive firms exporting and less productive firms
being driven out by cheaper imports. Accordingly, the non-tradeables sec-
tor shrinks and production is reallocated to better match diﬀerences in ef-
ficiency/productivity. This is like a general productivity increase. As a
consequence employment as well as real wages increase. These changes all
tend to increase welfare.
The following is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a two-country
general equilibrium model with trade frictions and diﬀerences in comparative
advantages. Section 3 considers wage determination and the basic eﬀects of
product market integration, while section 4 analyses the general equilibrium
eﬀects of reductions in trade frictions. Section 5 oﬀers a few concluding
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remarks.
2 Product market integration
Consider the following stylized situation. We have two representative (Euro-
pean) countries trading with each other in various products subject to trade
frictions. An ongoing integration process reduces frictions in goods trade.
Neither real capital (surpressed) nor labour is mobile across countries. Prod-
uct markets are competitive2, but labour is organized in trade unions setting
a wage under a right to manage structure. The countries are assumed to be
symmetric with respect to technology and the distribution of relative factor
supplies (see below).
Households
Households demand a variety of diﬀerentiated goods, and they can acquire
goods from either domestic or foreign producers. Each household supplies a
specific type of labour matching the labour requirements of one particular
production activity (see below). Moreover, households own firms and are
entitled to profits. The utility of the representative household type h ∈ [0, 1]
is assumed to be
Uh = ch − dlγh, γ > 1. (1)
This formulation captures the utility from consumption of the private con-
sumption bundle ch (see below), and the disutility of work lh. Note that d
normalizes the disutility of work to the utility of consumption. The budget
constraint of the household reads
Qch = Ih +Πh, (2)
where Q is the consumer price index (see below), Πh denotes nominal profits
and Ih nominal labour income.
The consumption bundle, ch, is defined over commodities of diﬀerent
types, produced in diﬀerent sectors, indexed by j,
ch = [
Z 1
0
c
θ−1
θ
hj dj]
θ
θ−1 , (3)
2Note that the same mechanism determining the boundary between exports, imports
and non-tradeables is present if firms are in a monopolistically competitive (Bertrand)
position, see Andersen (2002).
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where θ (> 1) measures the elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerent
types of goods. The associated price index is given by
Q ≡ [
Z 1
0
Q1−θj dj]
1
1−θ . (4)
The demand by household h of commodities of type j is given as
chj = [
Qj
Q
]−θch. (5)
The consumption bundle of goods of type j is similarly defined over sub-
types of products indexed by i, i.e.
chj = [
Z 1
0
c
θ−1
θ
hji di]
θ
θ−1 . (6)
For simplicity the elasticity of substitution between these subtypes of goods
is also assumed to be given by θ. The associated price index is
Qj ≡ [
Z 1
0
Q1−θji di]
1
1−θ , (7)
and the demand by household h of commodity i, produced in sector j, is
given as
chji = [
Qji
Qj
]−θchj. (8)
Aggregate demands are found by aggregation of demand by individual
households to read
cj = [
Qj
Q
]−θc, (9)
cji = [
Qji
Qj
]−θcj, (10)
where c is aggregate consumption.
Consumers can acquire the commodities they buy from either domestic
or foreign producers of consumption goods. A given variety i in the goods
category j is oﬀered by domestic producers at a price Pji and by foreign
producers at a price P ∗ji. However, there are frictions involved in international
trade (see e.g. Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977)) which can be
thought of as various non-tariﬀ impediments to trade. These costs can also
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be interpreted as information or search costs concerning foreign markets, and
they can include both fixed and proportional components. However, since
the qualitative results of the paper hold in either case, we chose to work with
the more simple case of proportional costs.
Let zji denote the gross costs of acquiring one unit from a foreign supplier.
Hence, zji ≥ 1 since acquisition of one unit of the commodity may absorb
resources to overcome trade frictions (zji = 1 corresponds to frictionless in-
ternational trade). It is assumed that the trade friction is a function of an
indicator variable τ , i.e. zji = zji(τ), where zji is increasing in τ . The para-
meter τ will in the following be varied to capture product market integration
arising from a reduction in trade frictions.
Domestic consumers choose a domestic supplier if
Pji ≤ P ∗jizji, (11)
while a foreign supplier is chosen if
Pji > P ∗jizji. (12)
It follows that the consumer price Qji = Pji if the final good is acquired
from a domestic producer, and Qji = P ∗jizji if it is acquired from a foreign
producer.
Producers
Firms in sector j produce goods of type j by use of labour type j, subject to
a linear production technology
yji = Ajilji, (13)
where Aji is an exogenous productivity parameter. The productivity para-
meter allows for trade based on diﬀerences in comparative advantages (see
below).
The relative productivity of domestic labour to foreign labour in produc-
ing commodity i in sector j is defined as
aji ≡
Aji
A∗ji
. (14)
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The comparative advantage variable aji is symmetrically distributed with
a density function3 g(aji), where aji ∈ [λ−1, λ], λ > 1.4 This implies that
aji = 1 for i = 1/2, that is, for half the goods, the domestic economy has a
comparative advantage relative to the foreign country and vice versa. Note
that it is an implication that the average skill levels are the same in the two
countries. The distribution of comparative advantages can reflect historic
specialization in various product varieties (see e.g. Grossman and Helpman
(1995)).
The production structure captures that various producers in a certain
sector convert similar kinds of inputs into diﬀerent final consumption goods.
There is perfect competition and, hence, the price is
Pji = A−1ji Wj. (15)
where Wj is the wage rate in the domestic country in sector j.
Using this price formula, it is possible to determine which final goods are
produced domestically, and which are imported. To this end consider first
the condition ensuring that domestic consumers choose a domestic supplier
(i.e. (11)) which can be written as
A−1ji Wj ≤ zjiA∗−1ji W ∗j , (16)
or
wj ≤ zjiaji, (17)
where wj =
Wj
W∗j
is the relative wage.
Similarly, foreign consumers choose domestic suppliers if
wj ≤ z−1ji aji. (18)
We thus have that a specific commodity i in product group j is exported
provided i ∈ Ej, where
Ej =
©
i | wj < z−1ji aji
ª
, (19)
3It is assumed that g(aji) < g∗, that is, the distribution of comparative advantage does
not have too much mass at a single point.
4Assume that Aji is uniformly distributed over the interval [1− x, 1 + x] and similarly
for A∗ji. Hence
Aji
A∗ji
is distributed over the interval
h
1−x
1+x ,
1+x
1−x
i
, with a density function
with the property that g( 1
y
) = g(y).
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is a non-traded good provided i ∈ NTj, where
NTj =
©
i | zjiaji ≥ wj ≥ z−1ji aji
ª
, (20)
and, finally, that it is imported if i ∈ Ij,where
Ij = {i | wj > zjiaji} . (21)
Whether given commodities are exported, imported or non-traded is deter-
mined endogenously depending on relative wages, comparative advantages
and trade frictions. Trade can be interpreted as intra-industrial trade since
there is trade within industry j with some product types being exported
and other types being imported. It is an implication that trade is related to
specialization as export goods are only produced in the home country and
vice versa for import goods. The non-traded sector represents varieties being
produced in both countries. If lower trade frictions lead to more trade (see
below) and a shrinking non-tradeable sector, it follows that this is accompa-
nied by more specialization. Observe that there is never two-way trade of
identical commodities (ji), but there is export and import of commodities of
a given category (j).
For later reference, observe that consumer prices are given as
Qji =
½
Pji = A−1ji Wj if i ∈ Ej U NTj
zjiP ∗ji = zjiA
∗−1
ji W
∗
j if i ∈ Ij
, (22)
and therefore
Qj =
"
W 1−θj
Z
i∈Ej∪NTj
Aθ−1ji di+W
∗1−θ
j
"Z
i∈Ij
z1−θji A
∗θ−1
ji di
## 1
1−θ
. (23)
Since all sectors are symmetric this also defines the aggregate price level
(Qj = Q).
Labour demand
The demand for labour of variety j can now be determined. Although not
directly in competition over jobs with foreign workers, the domestic workers
are aﬀected by international trade, since the wage rate aﬀects the competi-
tiveness of domestic firms and hence which goods become traded.
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Seen from the perspective of the workers, the home market is thus
Hj = Ej ∪ NTj = {i | wj ≤ zjiaji} , (24)
and the export market is
Ej =
©
i | wj < z−1ji aji
ª
. (25)
We make the monotonicity assumption that both aji and zji are monotone
increasing in i, where εaji,i > εzji,i.
5 It then follows that there exists a
critical value of i- in the following denoted iH- with the property that all
i ≥ iH belong to Hj. Similarly, there is a critical value of i - in the following
denoted iE- with the property that all i ≥ iE belong to Ej. Note6 that
iE ≥ iH . It also follows that iE = iE(wj, τ) and iH = iH(wj, τ), where
∂iE
∂wj > 0, and
∂iH
∂wj > 0, i.e. an increase in the relative wage of domestic labour
increases the range of goods being imported and reduces the range of goods
being exported. A reduction of trade frictions leads to an increase in iH and
a decrease in iE, i.e. more imports and exports and the non-tradeables sector
shrinks. Figure 1 illustrates the endogenous determination of which goods
are traded and the direction of trade as well as how this is aﬀected by a
reduction of trade frictions.
Figure 1:
 
 
 
 
 
5In the following εx,y denotes the elasticity of x wrt y.
6Since zji ≥ 1, it follows that i ∈ Ej ⇒ i ∈ Hj , while i ∈ Hj ; i ∈ Ej .
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Using the demand and production functions (i.e. (9), (10) and (13)), the
total labour demand in sector j can be written
Lj =
Z 1
iH
1
Aji
[
Qji
Qj
]−θ[
Qj
Q
]−θcdi+
Z 1
iE
zji
Aji
[
Q∗ji
Q∗j
]−θ[
Q∗j
Q∗
]−θc∗di, (26)
The first part on the RHS gives the labour demand generated by supplying
goods to the domestic market, and the second part is the labour demand gen-
erated by supplying to the foreign market. Inserting the relevant consumer
prices, we find that
Lj = φ
H(
Wj
W ∗j
, τ)[
Wj
Q
]−θc+ φE(
Wj
W ∗j
, τ)[
Wj
Q∗
]−θc∗ (27)
where
φH(
Wj
W ∗j
, τ) ≡
Z 1
iH
Aθ−1ji di, (28)
φE(
Wj
W ∗j
, τ) ≡
Z 1
iE
z1−θji A
θ−1
ji di. (29)
Note that φH is positively related to the share of production going to the
home market, and φE to the share of production going to the foreign market.
Equilibrium conditions
By using that there are no profits in equilibrium, it follows from the budget
constraint of the households that
c =
Z 1
0
WjLjdj. (30)
It is an implication that trade is balanced. Moreover, labour demand (see
(27)) equals labour supply (see below), and total demand for a given product
variety equals supply, i.e.
cji + c∗ji = yji for i ∈ Ej, (31)
cji = yji for i ∈ NTj, (32)
cji + c
∗
ji = y
∗
ji for i ∈ Ij. (33)
Similar relations hold for the foreign country.
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3 Wage formation
Assume that workers supplying labour used for production in sector j are
organized in a trade union setting the wage under a right to manage structure
and taking all aggregate variables as given. The trade union is assumed to
be utilitarian, and, since the disutility of work is increasing in employment,
trade union members share the employment. That is the wage is chosen so
as to solve
Max Uj =
Wj
Q
Lj
M
− d
µ
Lj
M
¶γ
, (34)
whereM is the number of trade union members. The wage rate turns out to
be
Wj
Q
=
εLj ,Wj
1 + εLj ,Wj
dγ
µ
Lj
M
¶γ−1
(35)
Equation (35) gives the wage curve as depending on the mark-up parameter,
determined in the usual way via the elasticity of labour demand εLj ,Wj , the
parameter d determining the level of disutility of work, and the amount of
employment (with an elasticity γ − 1 > 0).
Labour demand elasticity
The wage curve (35) includes the crucial eﬀect linking product market and
labour markets, namely, the elasticity εLj ,Wj and, therefore, the trade-oﬀ
between wages and employment faced by workers. This in turn aﬀects the
market power of trade unions.
The labour demand elasticity is found to be:
εLj ,Wj = −θ + vεφH ,Wj + (1− v)εφE ,Wj , (36)
where v denotes the share of production going to the home market
v ≡
φH(WjW∗j
, τ)[WjQ ]
−θy
φH(WjW∗j
, τ)[WjQ ]
−θy + φE(WjW∗j
, τ)[WjQ∗ ]
−θy∗
. (37)
One important fact concerning the demand elasticity for labour is that
its numerical value exceeds the underlying elasticity of consumer demand,
i.e. (see Appendix)
εLj ,Wj < −θ. (38)
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The intuition is that there are two dimensions of substitution, namely, be-
tween diﬀerent commodities and between domestic and foreign suppliers.
When demands are relocated between domestic and foreign firms, it corre-
sponds to production (employment) becoming more mobile across national
borders even though factor mobility is nil. This implies that the labour
demand elasticity is higher in an open economy than in a closed economy.
However, how further integration aﬀects the labour demand elasticity is in
general ambiguous, i.e.
∂εLj ,Wj
∂τ
=
∂
h
vεφH ,Wj + (1− v)εφE ,Wj
i
∂τ
R 0. (39)
In general it is not possible to conclude whether eﬀective bargaining power
of unions decreases or increases. As shown below it is still possible to make
inference on how real wages and employment are aﬀected in general equilib-
rium. This points out that the strong focus in the literature on the eﬀects of
product market integration on labour demand elasticities may be potentially
misleading, since it overlooks important general equilibrium eﬀects.
4 General equilibrium
The global or two-country general equilibrium can fairly easily be worked out
exploiting the symmetry conditions made in the model.
Trade
First consider trade. In the symmetric equilibrium, the home markets in the
two countries are of equal size, i.e.
iH = 1− iE. (40)
Lower trade frictions imply that iH increases and iE decreases. From (40),
it follows that there is an increase in the range of commodities which are
exported which is similar to the increase in the range of commodities which
are imported. That is, the non-tradeable sector decreases both because more
goods are exported and because more goods are imported. It is an implica-
tion that production becomes more specialized reflecting that the allocation
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of production across countries to a larger extent reflects comparative advan-
tages. Trade is thus driven by productivity, and production becomes more
eﬃciently allocated the lower are the trade frictions.
Productivity
Aggregate labour productivity for the types of activities in operation domes-
tically can be written
A ≡
R 1
iH AjidiR 1
iH di
, (41)
from which it follows that
∂A
∂iH
=
£
A−AjiH
¤ Z 1
iH
di > 0. (42)
A lower trade friction (τ) implies that iH increases and, therefore, that av-
erage productivity goes up7. The intuition is that further product market
integration implies that less eﬃcient domestic production is squeezed out by
more productive foreign production, i.e. production becomes more eﬃciently
allocated across countries according to comparative advantage. As a result
aggregate labour productivity goes up and this implies an outward shift in
the possibility set of real wages and employment available to the economy.
Wages and employment
Turning to equilibrium real wages and employment, we find by imposing
the conditions for a symmetric equilibrium on (27) that the real wage is
determined from the relation
1 =
£
φH(1, τ) + φE(1, τ)
¤
[
W
Q
]1−θ. (43)
The definitions of φH and φE (see (28) and (29)) and (40), imply that
∂φH(1, τ)
∂τ
+
∂φE(1, τ)
∂τ
> 0. (44)
7Note that since production is distributed according to comparative advantage, and the
relative productivity of domestic firms is increasing in the index i it follows that A > AjiH .
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It follows that the real wage is decreasing in the level of trade frictions, by
use of (44) and (43), i.e.
∂
³
W
Q
´
∂τ
< 0. (45)
Lower trade frictions lead to higher real wages for two reasons, namely, the
direct eﬀect arising from lower prices of all imported commodities, and the
indirect eﬀect arising from better match of production according to com-
parative advantages. The latter is like a general productivity increase, cf.
above. It is noteworthy that the demand elasticity εLj ,Wj does not enter this
expression.
It follows straightforwardly (by using (27), (44) and (45)) that employ-
ment is also decreasing in the level of trade frictions, i.e.
∂L
∂τ
< 0. (46)
Accordingly, a reduction of trade frictions leads to an increase in both real
consumption wages and employment in equilibrium.
Welfare
Finally, consider the welfare eﬀects. The utility of households can in sym-
metric equilibrium be written
U =
W
Q
L
M
− d
µ
L
M
¶γ
. (47)
By using (35), (45) and (46), it follows that
∂U
∂τ
=
∂WQ
∂τ
L
M
+
·
εLj ,Wj
1 + εLj ,Wj
− 1
¸
dγ
µ
L
M
¶γ−1 ∂ LM
∂τ
> 0. (48)
A decrease in the trade friction (τ) gives rise to an unambiguous improvement
in welfare, and the reason being that there is a gain arising from higher
real wages as well as higher employment. There are several reasons for the
increasing welfare. The reduction in trade costs saves resources which in
turn gives rise to a decrease in consumer prices. Furthermore, since more
goods become traded, there is increasing specialization in goods production
which also tends to give rise to lower consumer prices. Finally, observe that
the higher the market power of unions (the less sensitive employment is to
wages) the lower is employment and, therefore, the larger the gains from
improvements in employment.
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5 Concluding remarks
We have analysed the eﬀects of a reduction in international trade frictions
in a setting with trade driven by comparative advantages and when labour
markets are imperfectly competitive (unionized). One implication of product
market integration is further specialization in goods production implying a
more eﬃcient exploitation of comparative advantages. This improved pos-
sibility for international trade in goods spills over to the labour market.
This may be seen as a change in the labour demand elasticity changing the
employment and wage trade-oﬀ for the trade unions.
Unions may loose power to the extent that employment becomes more
sensitive to the wage rate. However, even if unions loose power in this sense,
the net result of the decreasing trade costs is an increase in the real wage and
an increase in employment. Therefore, trade union members become better
oﬀ, and total welfare increases.
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APPENDIX
From (28) and (29) we have
φH(
Wj
W ∗j
, τ) =
Z 1
iH
Aθ−1ji di, (49)
φE(
Wj
W ∗j
, τ) =
Z 1
iE
z1−θji A
θ−1
ji di. (50)
First, we notice that φH(WjW∗j , τ) ≥ φ
E(
Wj
W∗j
, τ). This follows by observing that
z−θji ≤ 1 and that iH ≤ iE.
Next, we shall prove that vεφH ,wj + (1− v)εφE ,wj ≤ 0.
Note first that
wj = ajiHzjiH , (51)
wj = ajiEz
−1
jiE . (52)
defines iHand iE as implicit functions of wj, where
∂iH
∂wj
> 0,
∂iE
∂wj
> 0,
since
∂
¡
ajiHzjiH
¢
∂i
i
ajiHzjiH
= εaji,i + εzji,i > 0,
∂
³
ajiEz
−1
jiE
´
∂i
i
ajiEz
−1
jiE
= εaji,i − εzji,i > 0,
where the signs follow from the assumptions made on aji and zji. It follows
straightforwardly that
εφH ,wj = −A
θ−1
jiH
∂iH
∂wj
wj
φH
< 0 (53)
εφE ,wj = −A
θ−1
jiE z
1−θ
jiE
∂iE
∂wj
wj
φE
< 0 (54)
Since 0 ≤ v ≤ 1, it follows that vεφH ,wj + (1− v)εφE ,wj ≤ 0.
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